Short run effects of bleaker prospects for oligopolistic producers of a non-renewable resource by Grimsrud, Kristine M. et al.
Short run effects of bleaker prospects for
oligopolistic producers of a non-renewable resource∗
Kristine Grimsrud†, Knut Einar Rosendahl‡, Halvor Briseid Storrøsten§
and Marina Tsygankova¶
February 13, 2015
Abstract
In a non-renewable resource market with imperfect competition,
both the resource rent and the current market influence large resource
owners’ optimal supply. New information regarding future market con-
ditions that affect the resource rent will consequently impact current
supply. Bleaker demand prospects tend to accelerate resource extrac-
tion. We show, however, that it may slow down early extraction by
producers with sufficiently large reserves and thus small resource rents.
The reason is that the supply from such producers is driven more by
current market considerations than concern about resource scarcity.
As producers with relatively smaller reserves accelerate their supply
in response to bleaker demand prospects, producers with sufficiently
large reserves will reduce their current supply. The surge in shale gas
production will reduce residual demand suppliers to the European gas
market. We demonstrate the effects of this in a numerical model. Most
gas producers accelerate their supply while Russia reduces its supply
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slightly and thus loses market shares even before the additional gas
enters the market.
Keywords: Resource extraction; Cournot competition; European
gas market.
JEL classification: Q31; Q33; Q42.
1 Introduction
For decades the dominating suppliers to the European natural gas market
have been Russia, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and
Algeria. Since the early 1980’s these five countries have jointly supplied at
least two thirds of the total gas supply to the European Union (EU). In
2013 Russia supplied 33 % of the natural gas consumed in Europe (BP,
2014). Due to recent technological progress, increased supply of shale gas
and other unconventional natural gas is expected in the coming decades,
both in the US and elsewhere (EIA, 2013; IEA, 2013; Gabriel et al., 2013).
The International Energy Agency (IEA) considers the surge in US shale gas
production and reserves over the last 7-10 years game-changing events for
the world’s gas markets (IEA, 2012).
Regional gas markets are gradually becoming more integrated through
increased trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG trade combined with
unconventional gas production and the emergence of new gas exporters will
alter patterns of trade in natural gas. The Middle East and Africa are ex-
pected to ship their LNG to Europe and Asia rather than to North America,
and countries in and outside Europe, such as Poland and the US, may be-
come new gas exporters on the international market.1 Thus, the surge in
shale gas production has undoubtedly affected the expectations for future
market conditions for today’s natural gas producers, also in Europe.
In determining their optimal production level, gas producers must con-
1To illustrate, in 2007 EIA forecasted US natural gas imports to increase and cover
more than 20% of total US natural gas consumption in 2030 (EIA, 2007b). EIA are now
instead expecting the US to be a net gas exporter some years prior to 2020 (EIA, 2014).
In addition to the potential future supply from US to Europe, this implies that LNG
exporters will find it more profitable to ship their gas to Europe/Asia instead of the US.
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sider the optimal dynamic extraction path since natural gas is a non-renewable
resource; cf. the extensive literature on non-renewable resources building on
Hotelling (1931). Intuitively, the optimal path depends on the size of the
resource stock and, important to this discussion, on expected future market
conditions.
Heal (1976) demonstrated that the presence of a backstop technology
affects current extraction of non-renewable resources. Dasgupta and Heal
(1979) showed that the timing of the availability of the backstop technology
alters the whole price path. In particular, the price path shifts upward if
the availability of the backstop technology occurs later in time. Further,
Sweeney (1993) showed that an expected decline in future demand will tend
to accelerate resource extraction. Thus, it was early recognized that revised
expectations regarding future market conditions will tend to affect current
extraction of non-renewable resources. Whereas Dasgupta and Heal (1979)
considered the timing of the backstop technology, altered expectations could
also, for example, be induced by new suppliers or policy changes (e.g. cli-
mate policies). New information about reduced future profitability, either
through lower future demand or increased future supply by competing pro-
ducers, give non-renewable resource owners incentives to shift some of their
extraction toward the present. The Green paradox literature shows that
this could produce some undesired effects of environmental policies (see e.g.
Sinn (2008), Gerlagh (2010) and Hoel (2011)).
The literature on exhaustible resource extraction and revised expecta-
tions about the future, such as the Green paradox literature, has generally
assumed competitive markets, but non-renewable resource markets are often
dominated by one or a few suppliers. For instance, OPEC dominates the
oil market and the European gas market is typically modeled as a Cournot
game in the economics literature (see, e.g., Golombek et al., 1995, 1998;
Holz et al., 2008, 2009; Zwart, 2009).
Hence, another important strand of the non-renewable resource literature
has considered oligopolistic producers. The so-called ’oil’igopoly theory was
developed by Salant (1976) who modeled the oil market using a dynamic
Nash-Cournot approach. This theory has later been extended by e.g. Loury
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(1986), Hartwick and Sadorsky (1990) and Polasky (1992). Polasky also
found empirical support for the predictions of the theory using data on
proven reserves and production for a cross-section of oil exporting countries.
More recently, Boyce and Voitassak (2008) examined a model of ‘oil’igopoly
where exploration can be used strategically by the firms.
Our paper contributes to the literature by combining the insights from
Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Sweeney (1993) and the Green paradox lit-
erature with the theory of oil’igopoly to analyze the current impacts of
changes in future market conditions. To our knowledge, this issue has not
yet been examined. The case we have in mind is the the surge in shale
gas production, and its impacts on the European gas market. Importantly,
the analysis takes into account heterogeneous reserves of the oligopolistic
non-renewable resource suppliers to the European gas market; in particular
Russia has substantially greater reserves than the other suppliers.2 We find,
both analytically and numerically, that considering oligopolists with un-
equal remaining reserves may produce results that differ qualitatively from
the results with a competitive supply, and at first sight, our results may ap-
pear counter intuitive. Although this study is inspired by the surge in shale
gas production, our findings may generalize to other non-renewable resource
markets with imperfectly competitive and heterogeneous producers.
The paper proceeds by developing a dynamic, theoretical model of two
Cournot producers that differ with respect to reserve levels.3 The analyt-
ical results show that although total market supply increases initially as a
response to a fall in future demand, producers who possess sufficiently large
reserves may in fact reduce their current supply when future market con-
ditions become less profitable. The reason is that the supply decision of a
producer with sufficiently large reserves is driven more by the current market
2Russia’s remaining gas reserves were at the end of 2013 about four times bigger than
the combined reserves of Norway, Algeria, the Netherlands, and the UK (BP, 2014). Rus-
sia’s expected future exports to Europe largely outstrip that of the other countries even
when accounting for that most of Russia’s production is consumed domestically, (cf. e.g.
BP, 2014).
3The results are also relevant for the Cartel-Fringe game (see, e.g. Salant, 1976; and
Benchekroun and Withagen, 2012), which is frequently applied to analysis of the global
oil market, see Subsection 2.2.
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conditions than by the resource (scarcity) rent, as compared to a producer
who possesses smaller reserves. As a result the smaller resource owner tends
to move its extraction toward the present, while the large resource owner
may find it profitable to decrease its initial production.
The paper continues by presenting a dynamic and more realistic numer-
ical simulation model of the European gas market. The numerical model
analyzes how new information about a future increase in unconventional
gas supply affects producers’ current supply decisions. The simulation re-
sults suggest that all Cournot producers except Russia will increase their
initial gas exports to Europe. Russia will instead reduce its current exports
to Europe. The explanation is that Russia’s remaining reserves are vast
compared to the other countries supplying gas to Europe (see footnote 2).
Thus, Russia’s per unit scarcity rent is relatively small compared to the other
producers’ scarcity rent. This induces Russia to put more weight on current
market conditions and less weight on scarcity considerations, as compared
with the other suppliers. Hence, whereas the other Cournot producers in-
crease their joint market share by almost 3% initially, Russia’s market share
drops by 1.5%.
Our results imply that changes in future market conditions, such as the
surge in shale gas production, affect the production profiles of heterogeneous
oligopolistic firms differently. This is particularly relevant for the composi-
tion of supply. For example, our numerical results suggest that the Russian
market share in the European gas market may decline even before the addi-
tional gas supply enters the market, slightly relieving European dependence
on gas imports from Russia. The tense situation between EU and Russia
caused by the Ukrainian conflict stresses the importance of multiple natural
gas suppliers to the European market. On the other hand, Russia’s depen-
dence on the European market for natural gas revenues was relieved by the
recent agreement to deliver gas to China by 2020.
Similar effects on the composition of gas supply may follow from poli-
cies that reduce future demand for gas (e.g., R&D subsidies to renewable
energy). Moreover, we find that, compared to a competitive resource mar-
ket, Cournot competition in strategic substitutes moderates the increase
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in aggregate current production induced by bleaker future prospects. This
suggests that market power may lessen (but not remove) the Green para-
dox through its dampening effect on the increase in early production and
emissions caused by lower future demand.
While the analytical model in Section 2 is relatively simple in order to
derive transparent and intuitive analytical results, modeling the European
gas market in sections 3 and 4 requires a more realistic numerical model.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical analysis
We consider a non-renewable resource market with two Cournot firms i and
j, each with resource extraction flow rate at time t given by qit ≥ 0 and
qjt ≥ 0, respectively.4 Constant marginal extraction costs are denoted ci
and cj , whereas Sit and Sjt denote the finite resource stocks of the firms
at time t. The equilibrium concept is that of an Open-loop Nash-Cournot
equilibrium and we assume perfect information.5
The resource price is given by pt = Kt − qit − qjt, where Kt is an ex-
ogenous, time-dependent choke price expressing the level of the residual de-
mand. We assume that the choke price always exceeds the firms’ marginal
costs (Kt > ci, cj). While the model is formulated in continuous time, the
planning horizon encompasses two discrete time periods; period 1 (t ∈ [0, T ))
and period 2 (t ∈ [T,∞)), where T is exogenous. Compared to period 1,
period 2 is characterized by a drop in residual demand. To simplify, we
assume that Kt is constant in each time period, i.e., Kt = K1 in time period
1 and Kt = K2 in time period 2. We assume that it is optimal for the firms
4The theoretical analysis is at firm level, while the players are countries in the numerical
model in Sections 3 and 4.
5The simplifying assumptions about costs and reserves are in line with much of the
Green paradox literature (e.g., Chakravorty et al., 2011; Hoel, 2011), and are needed to
derive transparent analytical results. Some studies assume that unit costs are increasing
in accumulated extraction (e.g., Sinn, 2008; Gerlagh, 2011), which is the assumption we
apply in the numerical model in Sections 3-4. Exploration is typically disregarded in this
strand of the literature, but has been examined in some studies of non-renewable resources
(e.g., Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn, 1989; Boyce and Voitassak, 2008).
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to produce in both periods.
The drop in future residual demand is modeled as a reduction of the pa-
rameter Kt, i.e., K1 > K2. The fall may be caused by, e.g., the development
of viable renewable substitutes, introduction of end-use taxes, or changes in
consumer preferences. In the numerical analysis in Sections 3-4, we examine
the European gas market where the fall in future residual demand is caused
by increased production of shale gas.
The model is best examined by backwards induction starting with period
2.
2.1 Production in period 2
In the second time period firm i maximizes profits pii, where r refers to the
discount rate:
pii(SiT ) = max
qit
ˆ ∞
T
e−rt[(K2 − qit − qjt)− ci]qitdt, (1)
subject to:
S˙it = −qit (2)
and Sit ≥ 0. The remaining resource stock of producer i at time t is
Sit = SiT −
´ t
T qiτdτ . We observe that the profits earned in period 2 equals
the salvage value of the resource at the end of period 1. The shadow value of
the resource stock is positive for finite resource stocks (∂pii/∂SiT > 0) and
increasing in the parameter K2, that is, ∂ (∂pii/∂SiT ) /∂K2 > 0 for finite
stock SiT . The last inequality states that an increase in the resource stock
is more valuable for a larger resource demand (due to a higher resource
price).
2.2 Production in period 1
In the first time period firm i maximizes profits:
max
qit
ˆ T
0
e−rt[(K1 − qit − qjt)− ci]qitdt+ pii(SiT ) (3)
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subject to equations (1) and (2), and Sit ≥ 0. The current value Hamiltonian
is H = [(K1 − qit − qjt)− ci − λit]qit (see e.g. Sydsæter et al., 2008), which
is concave in qit. According to the Maximum principle, the interior solution
profit maximizing extraction path must satisfy:
Hqt = K1 − ci − 2qit − qjt − λit = 0, (4)
λ˙it − rλit = −HSit = 0, (5)
λiT =
∂pii
∂SiT
, (6)
where equation (6) is the transversality condition. It states that the shadow
price of the resource at time T must equal the marginal contribution of the
resource to the salvage value, i.e., ∂pii/∂SiT . In other words, the marginal
discounted value of the resource must be equal across the two time periods.
Otherwise, the firm could increase the present value of profits by moving
resource extraction from one period to the other.
Solving the differential equation (5), we get λit = Ce
rt, where the
constant C solves the boundary condition CerT = λiT . Hence, we have
λit = λiT e
r(t−T ). Insertion in (4) yields K1 − ci − 2qi − qj − λiT er(t−T ) = 0.
Solving this system of two equations and using (6), we obtain:
qit =
1
3
(
Ai +
(
∂pij
∂SjT
− 2 ∂pii
∂SiT
)
er(t−T )
)
, (7)
with Ai = K1 − 2ci + cj . Differentiating (8) with respect to K2, i.e., the
demand parameter in period 2, yields:
∂qit
∂K2
=
1
3
(
∂(∂pij/∂SjT )
∂K2
− 2∂(∂pii/∂SiT )
∂K2
)
er(t−T ). (8)
Equation (8) captures two opposing effects on firm i’s production caused by
a reduction in future demand (−∂qit/∂K2). The second term of the large
parenthesis in (8) is an intertemporal effect: a fall in future demand induces
the resource owning firm i to increase current production. The reason is that
the discounted net present value of the resource must be equalized across
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time. Moving production from period 2 to period 1 offsets the relative fall in
future net present value of the resource caused by the drop in future demand.
The same reason, however, causes the competitor firm j to also increase its
production in period 1. Because the firms’ outputs are strategic substitutes
there is a second and static effect, which is captured by the first term of
the large parenthesis in (8): when firm j increases current production, the
product price decreases and induces firm i to produce less. This is a well
known result from analysis of Cournot competition (Tirole, 1988).
The overall effect, expansion or contraction of production in period 1, is
ambiguous for the individual firm and depends on whether the intertemporal
or the static effect dominates. The current market supply will increase,
however, because the static effect is caused by the fall in price.6 This may
be seen from (8), which implies that the change in aggregate production is:
∂qit
∂K2
+
∂qjt
∂K2
= −1
3
(
∂(∂pij/∂SjT )
∂K2
+
∂(∂pii/∂SiT )
∂K2
)
er(t−T ) < 0. (9)
This term is negative for finite resource stocks Si0 or Sj0 (and zero if both
stocks are infinite). That is, a decrease in future demand (fall in K2) in-
creases current aggregate production. In the particular case of identical
firms, both firms will increase their production in period 1. This result re-
lates to Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and the Green paradox literature (see
Section 1).
Now, assume instead that the two firms differ and that firm i has the
most reserves. For the sake of argument, let firm i’s reserves be near infinite,
i.e., SiT → ∞ with the resource rent consequently approaching zero, i.e.,
limSiT→∞ λiT = 0. It follows that limSiT→∞ ∂pii/∂SiT = 0 for any finite
level of K2, and thus it must be that limSiT→∞ (∂(∂pii/∂SiT )/∂K2) = 0. As
long as firm j’s reserves are finite, and firm j is producing in both periods,
it will still be true that ∂ (∂pij/∂SjT /∂K2) > 0. Equation (8) then reduces
6Farrel and Shapiro (1990) show that an autonomous change in the supply of one firm
moves total supply in the same direction, albeit in a smaller magnitude due strategic
effects (in static Cournot equilibrium).
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to:
lim
SiT→∞
∂qit
∂K2
=
1
3
(
∂
∂pij/∂SjT
∂K2
)
er(t−T ) > 0. (10)
This implies that firm i will reduce supply in period 1 when demand falls
in period 2 (i.e., a drop in K2), given that the reserves of firm i are suffi-
ciently large. Because aggregate production increases, it must be that firm
j, the firm with the smaller reserves, increases production more than firm i
decreases its production:
lim
SiT→∞
∂qjt
∂K2
= −2
3
(
∂
∂pij/∂SjT
∂K2
)
er(t−T ) < 0. (11)
Note that the smaller reserves firm j owns, the more profitable it may
be for the firm to extract all its reserves in period 1. In that case, the first
term in the parenthesis of equation (8) becomes zero. This implies that firm
i will increase its initial extraction if future demand declines regardless of
how large its reserves are.
We state the following result:7
Proposition 1. Consider a non-renewable resource market with two
Cournot players, linear demand, and two time periods. Both Cournot play-
ers produce in each period. Consider a decrease in demand in the second
period. We then have:
i) Aggregate initial production increases.
ii) A resource owner that owns sufficiently large reserves will reduce ini-
tial production.
Proof. The Proposition follows from equation (8).
The result arises from the two opposing mechanisms discussed imme-
diately after equation (8) and the observation that the decisions of firms
with ample reserves, and thus low scarcity values, are dominated by market
power considerations. In other words, the intertemporal effect is weak and
the static effect dominates for owners of sufficiently large reserves. Indeed,
7It can be shown that the Maximum principle leads to the equation rT˜i + e
−rT˜i =
1 + 3rSi/Ai + rT − erT in period 2, with Ai = K1 − 2ci + cj and T˜i being the last period
of production (in period 2). These equations do not admit analytical solutions for T˜i.
Therefore, a reduced form solution for ∂qit/∂K2 is not possible.
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at the limit, a firm with very large reserves may have approximately zero
net present value of an additional unit of the resource. Such a firm does
not delay any production due to scarcity considerations. Instead it concerns
itself only with strategic effects and will thus reduce its current extraction
as other producers increase their extraction.
We observe that Proposition 1 arises from different resource stocks and
does not require marginal extraction costs to differ across firms, i.e. it re-
mains valid if ci = cj . On the other hand, Proposition 1 requires the marginal
revenue for each firm to be decreasing in aggregate output (strategic sub-
stitutes). In Proposition 1 this is guaranteed by the assumption of linear
demand. Note that, if the assumption about linear demand is relaxed, the
requirement for strategic substitutes, which is necessary for Proposition 1
to be valid, would equal that of a static Cournot setting in the limiting
case where the large firm’s resource stock approaches infinity (infinitesimal
resource rent).
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure was created using a
numerical model (in GAMS) that exactly replicates the theoretical model.
The parameter values are set to K1 = 500, ci = cj = 0, and r = 0.04. The
large firm’s resource stocks range from 1000 to 5000 along the horizontal axis.
The small firm’s resource stock is kept constant at 1000. We set K2 = 500
in the “no-shale scenario”. We then reduce this parameter to 400 in the
“shale scenario”, to illustrate a fall in future demand. The duopoly case
discussed above is labeled n = 1 + 1. For the chosen parameter values, the
large firm reduces early production when it controls approximately three
times as large initial reserves as the small firm. The figure also depicts a
scenario with one large and four small firms, where ’small’ firm is defined
as having initial reserves of Sj0 = 1000/4. In addition, the figure shows a
scenario with one large and nine small firms, where ’small’ now is defined
as having initial reserves of Sj0 = 1000/9. In the latter case, the oligopoly
rents of the nine small firms are negligible and they behave very similar
to competitive firms. Thus, this case approximates the well-known Cartel
versus fringe model (see, e.g., Salant 1976).
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Figure 1. Production ratios of a large firm in the first period with
various number of firms (n).
As small firms are added to the market, they become less responsive to
the fall in price induced by their own increased supply. Thus, the decline in
future demand causes a stronger acceleration in the small firms’ extraction
profiles than in the duopoly case. This acceleration impacts the large firm
in two ways: First, increased current supply strengthens the static effect.
Second, as the small firms shift production forward in time, they have less
reserves left to produce in the future. This weakens the intertemporal effect
for the large firm. As a result, it becomes even more profitable for the large
firm to delay production as compared with the duopoly case.
The slope and vertical placement of the graphs in Figure 1 depend on
the chosen parameter values. For example, with a lower discount rate r,
future profits become more valuable and hence the intertemporal effect is
more pronounced. The curves in Figure 1 then shift upward meaning that
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a larger reserve level is required to induce the big firm to decrease its initial
supply.
Figure 2. Production ratios and production share in first period.
Proposition 1 assumes that both Cournot players produce in both peri-
ods. As mentioned above, if the smaller player has quite small reserves, it
is more likely that it will deplete its resources in the first period. Hence,
the intertemporal effect vanishes for this producer, and the large player will
increase its initial supply. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Here we keep the
sum of reserves of the two Cournot players constant and instead shift re-
serves from the small to the large producer as we move along the horizontal
axis (i.e., from symmetric duopoly towards monopoly). When the large pro-
ducer has a sufficiently large share of the market (at least 95 percent in our
case), the smaller firm stops producing before period 2 and thus the large
firm increases initial supply when future demand declines. This is also the
case when the large firm has a slightly lower market share (91−95 percent in
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our case), in which case the small firm produces very small amounts in the
second period. In that case the resource rent does not drop as much when
future demand decreases (the large player attempts to keep a high price),
and the intertemporal effect for the small firm is rather limited.
Whereas the theoretical results are driven by opposing mechanisms and
are ambiguous unless one of the player’s resource stock approaches infinity,
the outcome for a particular case can be investigated using numerical meth-
ods. The following section develops a numerical model for the European gas
market, which is characterized by several heterogeneous Cournot players.8
3 Numerical model description
We now turn to the European gas market and simulate the effects of a
negative shift in future residual demand for incumbent producers caused by
increased supply of unconventional gas.9 Major technological progress in
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have substantially increased the
expected supply of shale gas in the US over the next few decades (Gabriel
et al., 2013),10 as well as in Europe and elsewhere in the world in the longer
term (EIA, 2012; IEA, 2012). The base year of the simulation model is 2013,
and it runs with one-year time periods.
The European gas market currently has five large suppliers: Russia, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, the UK and Algeria. Several other European countries
produce some gas domestically, and there are imports from other parts of
the world (mainly through LNG). Consistent with previous models of the
European gas market (cf. Section 1 for references), we model the large sup-
pliers as Cournot players. The exception is the UK where remaining reserves
are low and production is not coordinated across companies.11 The supply
8The major differences between the theoretical and the numerical models are provided
in Table A1 in the appendix
9The numerical model was developed in GAMS and is available upon request. Selected
model parameters are given in Tables A2-4 in the appendix.
10Compare e.g. the completely different trade projections for the US in EIA (2007a)
and EIA (2012).
11There is no explicit supply coordination among companies on the Norwegian conti-
nental shelf either. However, Norwegian authorities can to a large degree regulate the
14
from the UK and other smaller European producers is considered exogenous
to simplify the model.12 Joint supply of LNG and pipeline imports from
other sources than Russia and Algeria is modeled as a linear and increasing
function of the gas price: qimpt = q
imp
0 +κtp
E
t , where κt > 0. The parameters
qimp0 and κ0 are calibrated based on data for 2013 (BP, 2014). The inverse
supply function tilts slightly downward over time in the model (i.e., κt is
increasing) reflecting the expectation of increased availability of gas imports
over the next few decades (cf. e.g. IEA, 2013).
A single representative gas consumer is the basis for the model of Eu-
ropean gas demand, which also includes Ukraine and Belarus. The model
assumes that gas demand in Europe (DE) decreases in the gas price, but in-
stead of a linear demand schedule as in Section 2, we assume a fixed long-run
price elasticity E (set equal to E = −0.5), i.e., DE = D¯Et ·
(
pEt
)E
, where
D¯Et is an exogenous variable.
13 Gas demand changes over time, e.g. due
to growth in GDP, and the level of D¯Et is calibrated based on IEA (2013)
projections of gas consumption towards 2035. After 2035 we assume a slight
decrease in the gas demand growth, implying a rather constant level of D¯Et
from 2050.
The four Cournot players take into account the price-responsiveness of
the demand-side and the supply of imported gas from other countries than
total extraction level through licensing of fields and pipelines. Moreover, Statoil has a
dominant position in Norway. The Dutch authorities explicitly regulate the extraction
rate of the major Groningen field.
12We assume that production from these countries declines by a fixed annual rate, so
that accumulated production over time equal reported reserves at the end of 2013. After
five years, total supply from these countries is less than Dutch supply in 2013. Hence,
modeling this supply as competitive would not alter our qualitative results.
13There is no clear consensus in the literature regarding direct price elasticities for
natural gas (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 2011). -0.5 is well within the range of long-run
estimates found in the literature.
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Russia and Algeria, and thus have the following maximization problem:14
pii = max
qit
T∑
t=0
(1 + r)−t
(
pEt (qt)− cit(Ait)− cτit
)
qit, (12)
subject to:
Ait+1 = Ait + qit (13)
where Ait denotes accumulated production, c
τ
it is the transport costs to the
European market, pEt (qt) is the residual inverse demand schedule facing the
oligolipolistic producers, and r is the producer discount rate. The discount
rate is set to four percent in the simulations, reflecting that long-run supply
of gas from these four countries is highly influenced by government decisions.
We assume that unit extraction costs increase in accumulated production
according to the following function:
cit(Ait) = c
0
i e
ηiAit−θit, (14)
which permits for exogenous technological progress through the annual rate
θi. Here c
0
i is the initial unit extraction costs, which are based on IEA (2009)
numbers but adjusted to 2013-$. The parameter ηi determines how quickly
unit costs rise as accumulated production increases and will, intuitively,
be higher the less reserves a country has. We calibrate this parameter for
each country based on reserve data from BP (2014).15 Note that we do
not assume a fixed resource stock here as we do in the theoretical model.
Nevertheless, at any given point in time only a finite amount of resources
will have unit extraction costs below the prevailing price.
14In the numerical model we simulate the market for a sufficiently high but finite number
of years, T . We have tested the effects of increasing the level of T (T = 150 in the reported
simulations), checking that the reported results (i.e., until 2050) are unaffected by the
choice of T .
15We simply assume that all reported reserves in the base year can be economically
extracted at the base year price. In other words: We assume that unit costs (plus transport
costs) become equal to the base year price when all reported reserves have been extracted
(and there is no technological change). For Algeria, however, we take into account that a
large share of Algerian production is consumed domestically or exported elsewhere. Thus,
we reduce the reserves destined for Europe by 50%.
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From the optimization problem above we derive the following first order
condition for the Cournot players (the derivation is shown in the Appendix):
cit(Ait) + c
T
it + λit = p
E
t ·
(
1 +
qit
EDE − κtpEt
)
, (15)
where λit now denotes the (positive) shadow price of the resource. This
condition corresponds to equation (4) in Section 2, with total marginal cost
(which is the marginal costs of production and transport plus the shadow
price) equal to marginal revenue.
The shadow price λit develops according to:
λit = (1 + r)λit−1 − ηicit(Ait)qit. (16)
Russia is the largest supplier of gas to the European market. The biggest
share of Russian gas production is consumed domestically, and we, therefore,
also model the Russian gas market in order to model Russian gas export to
Europe more accurately. A fixed price elasticity R, i.e., DR = D¯Rt ·
(
pRt
)R
is
also assumed to characterize Russian gas demand, but the Russian elasticity
is assumed to be -0.25, i.e., half of the European.16
Russian gas prices are highly regulated, but have been increased over the
last few years. From a Russian welfare perspective, the optimal policy may
be to set prices equal to the full marginal costs of production, including the
shadow costs of the resource. Hence, in our model we assume that Russia
will follow such a price policy in the long run. The simulated price for the
base year 2013 is slightly higher than the actual domestic gas tariff in Russia
that year.17 We then have the following first order condition for the Russian
gas market:
cRt(ARt) + λRt = p
R
t . (17)
16There are few studies of Russian price elasticities for gas. Solodnikova (2003) finds
no significant price effects at all, partly because a large part of Russian gas consumers
is not facing any price on their marginal gas consumption. Tsygankova (2010) uses an
elasticity of -0.4, as market reforms are expected to bring on more price responsiveness in
the Russian gas market.
17http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/gazprom-tariffs-
idUSL6N0BP8Z820130225
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Note that equations (13) and (16) must be adjusted for the Russian producer
to account for both supply to the domestic market and exports.
So far we have described what we refer to as the Benchmark scenario.
Next, we assume that in the Shale gas scenario, large volumes of extra gas
are supplied into the European market. This could be a mixture of US
LNG exports, other LNG volumes that are rerouted from the US to the
European market, and European shale gas (e.g., in Poland). We treat these
extra volumes, which gradually come into the market after 2020 and reach
a plateau of 150 bcm in 2035, as exogenous.18
4 Simulation results
4.1 Benchmark scenario
The simulation results show the effects of a shift in expectations regarding
future supply to the European gas market, that is, the difference between
the Shale gas and Benchmark scenarios. First, we consider the Benchmark
scenario and check that it fits reasonably well with actual and projected
supply and demand. Figure 3 displays how supply from different producers
develop until 2050.
We notice that Russian exports to Europe grow by almost 40% towards
2050, increasing Russia’s market share from 36% in 2009 to 51% in 2050
(remember that Europe here includes Ukraine and Belarus). Norway and the
Netherlands reduce their exports by one half and three quarters, respectively,
while Algerian exports first increase and then decrease somewhat.19 LNG
18The surge in shale gas production has probably had some impacts on the European
gas market already, but the larger effects will most likely come after 2020. Furthermore,
there is no consensus about the size of this effect nor its impact on the European gas
market. To put our numbers into perspective, however, in 2007 EIA expected that the US
would import around 150 bcm in 2030. Five years later, EIA expected an export level in
2035 of 70 bcm (EIA, 2007a, 2012). IEA (2013) projects global unconventional gas supply
to increase by 770 bcm in the period 2011-2035 (New Policies Scenario).
19In calibrating the model, we added a temporary cost element for Algeria, which de-
clines to zero after 25 years. This cost element reflects political and other unquantified
costs (cf. e.g. the attack on the gas facility near In Amenas in January 2013) that may
explain why Algeria, with total unit costs comparable with Norway but more reserves,
produce less than half of Norwegian output.
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and other imports besides from Russia/Algeria more than double over this
period, while other domestic production in Europe declines substantially
(by assumption). Total gas consumption is fairly constant until 2050.20
The direction of changes in market shares observed in the figure are in line
with most expectations about the European gas market, whether or not
unconventional gas supply is accounted for.
Figure 3. Supply of gas to the European market in Benchmark
scenario. Bcm per year.
The gas price in Europe increases from 390 to 600 $ per toe (in real
prices) during the period 2013-2050 (see Figure 4), reflecting diminishing
levels of profitable gas resources in most countries. The exceptions are Rus-
sia, which still holds large volumes of fairly cheap gas in 2050, and imports
from other regions (e.g., LNG). Russian domestic prices increases from 110 $
20The IEA (2013) projects a moderate growth until 2035. However, remember that the
Benchmark scenario by construction has an outdated view on future supply of unconven-
tional gas (as shale gas production is not included). Hence, the gas price in this scenario
rises more steeply than in the Shale gas scenario. In the latter scenario European gas
demand increases by around 10% until 2035, and is then rather constant to 2050.
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to 160 $ per toe during the period 2013-2050 (Russian gas demand increases
by 15% during this time period).
Figure 4. Price of gas in the European and Russian market in
Benchmark and Shale gas scenarios. $ per toe.
4.2 Increased supply of unconventional gas
We next consider the effects of adding substantial volumes of unconventional
gas to the European gas supply, gradually increasing the unconventional gas
supply from zero in 2020 to 150 bcm from 2035 onwards. Figure 4 shows
that the gas price increases more slowly in the Shale gas scenario than in
the Benchmark scenario, and is 75-125 $ per toe below the Benchmark price
during the last 20 years of our time horizon. We further notice that the
gas price drops in the Shale gas scenario even before the extra volumes of
unconventional gas enter the market.
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Figure 5. Changes in Cournot producers’ gas supply to the Euro-
pean market in the Shale gas scenario (relative to the Benchmark
scenario). Bcm per year.
The future price decrease gives non-renewable resource owners incentives
to move some of their production toward the present, which explains the
immediate price effect, cf. the theoretical discussion in Section 2. As seen
in Figure 5, after 2025 all gas producers reduce their supply in the Shale gas
scenario (compared to the Benchmark scenario). Moreover, Norway, Algeria
and the Netherlands all produce more in the Shale gas scenario than in the
Benchmark scenario until 2025. Hence we obtain the immediate price drop.
The results so far are as expected, given the findings in previous literature
referred to in Section 1. Figure 5 shows, however, that Russian gas exports
to Europe do not increase initially–it declines continuously throughout our
time horizon in the Shale gas scenario vis-a-vis the Benchmark scenario.
The initial output decrease is not big though–1.4%. Still, Russia acts quite
differently from the other Cournot players. Whereas the other Cournot
producers increase their joint market share by almost 3% initially, Russia’s
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market share drops by 1.5%. The country’s vast amounts of gas reserves
cause this behavior because decisions are more driven by the current market
situation than by future market expectations. Figure 6 confirms this result.
It shows how unit production costs, the shadow price of the resource, and
the oligopoly rent for Russia develop over time in the two scenarios. In
Figure 6, the shadow price ranges from 25 to 45 $ per toe, whereas the
oligopoly rent increases from 230 $ per toe initially to 390 $ per toe in
2050 in the Benchmark scenario. Thus, the non-renewability issue is not
particularly pressing for Russia. When the other Cournot players produce
more initially in the Shale gas scenario, Russia optimally cuts back on its
supply to Europe.
Figure 6. Unit production costs, shadow price and oligopoly rent
for Russia. $ per toe.
The simulation results are consistent with the findings in Section 2, which
considered a producer with vast reserves. In the simulations, increased fu-
ture supply of shale gas to the European market reduces Russian supply,
both today and in the time after the entry of shale gas. The reason is that
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Russia’s gas reserves are large enough that current market considerations
dominate scarcity concerns.
Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix show the development of costs and rents
for the three other Cournot players. We see that the shadow prices of their
gas resources are significantly greater than the oligopoly rents for all these
three players, i.e., quite the contrary of what we see for Russia in Figure 6.
The qualitative results, i.e., that Russia cuts back on its supply to Europe
while the other Cournot players produce more initially, are robust to various
assumptions about when, how quickly and how extensively unconventional
gas supply enters the European gas market. The qualitative results are also
robust to changes in most uncertain parameters of the model. Table A5 in
the appendix shows the results of sensitivity analyses where we either halve
or double the value of crucial parameters. Naturally, both the Benchmark
scenario and the Shale gas scenario change in all these cases. In Table A5
we display the percentage changes in initial supply from respectively Russia
and non-Russian Cournot producers to the European market, when shifting
from the Benchmark scenario to the Shale gas scenario. As shown in Table
A5, in 16 of the 18 sensitivity analyses Russian gas supply drops initially
when more shale gas supply is expected in the future.
The two exceptions are directly related to the resource rent (shadow
price) and the oligopoly rent, respectively (cf. Figure 6): If Russia’s gas
reserves are halved, the shadow price of its resources increases, and hence the
intertemporal effect becomes more important. Initial supply then increases
by 0.8% instead of decreases by 1.4% in the Shale gas scenario (compared
to the Benchmark scenario). If the price elasticity in Europe is doubled,
Russia is less able to increase the price by holding back supply, and hence
the oligopoly rent is lower. Russia’s initial supply is then almost the same
in the two scenarios (cf. Table A5). If we quadruple the elasticity to -2,
Russia increases its initial supply by almost one percent. This shows that
the numerical results are somewhat sensitive to the assumptions about some
central parameters. Furthermore, if the additional shale gas did not enter
before around 2045 (and this was known today), Russia would no longer
decrease its initial supply. The reason is that the other Cournot players
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have less profitable resources left after 2045, and will therefore shift less
extraction towards the present (see also the discussion of Figure 3 above).
It could be argued that Russia is more impatient about monetizing its
gas reserves than the other producers, e.g. due to fiscal constraint. If we
incorporate this into the model by increasing the discount rate in Russia to
say 10% (instead of 4%), Russia’s initial extraction increases, both in the
Benchmark scenario and the Shale gas scenario. However, when shifting
from the (new) Benchmark scenario to the (new) Shale gas scenario, the
initial gas extraction in Russia decreases a bit more strongly than in our
main scenarios. The reason is that when Russia is more impatient, the
dynamic aspect is less important, and thus the country is more concerned
about the current (static) Cournot game.
So far this paper has focused on additional supply of unconventional gas,
but other mechanisms could alter future residual demand for gas, too. We
have investigated whether these mechanisms would yield the same qualita-
tive results for the Cournot producers’ initial supply. Using our numerical
model we have therefore simulated the effects of i) a downward shift in the
inverse supply function of LNG/pipeline imports, ii) a downward shift in
gas demand, and iii) the introduction of a unit tax on gas consumption.
Whereas i) and ii) give the same qualitative outcome as in the Shale gas
scenario, we find that a future unit tax increases initial supply from Russia.
For details and explanations of these simulations, we refer to our working
paper Grimsrud et al. (2014).
5 Conclusions
In a non-renewable resource market, supply is governed both by current
prices and the resource rent. As is well known, new information about
bleaker future market conditions reduces the resource rent and thereby ac-
celerates total supply.
This paper has investigated how altered expectations about future mar-
ket conditions affect the current supply in a non-renewable market char-
acterized by heterogeneous producers and Cournot competition in strategic
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substitutes. We find that a firm that endows sufficiently large amounts of re-
serves may reduce current production if the net present value of the resource
declines in the future. The reason is that producers with extensive reserves
are less concerned about scarcity issues and the resource rent, whereas cur-
rent market considerations remain important. As producers with relatively
smaller reserves will tend to accelerate their supply, it may be optimal for a
producer with a relatively large reserve to cut back on its initial supply to
counteract the associated fall in the resource price.
Our results demonstrate that firms’ production profiles may be quite
differently affected by changes in future demand under oligopoly with het-
erogeneous firms than under oligopoly with homogenous firms or under com-
petitive supply. This is particularly relevant if one is concerned about the
composition of supply, e.g. for energy security reasons. In this respect, it
is interesting that our numerical simulations suggest that bleaker prospects
for oligopolistic gas suppliers in Europe, e.g., due to more supply of uncon-
ventional gas, will induce Russia to reduce exports of gas to Europe even
before the additional gas enters the market. Russia has limited incentives
to curb its current extraction in order to save more resources for the future
because of its vast natural gas reserves. Russia, therefore, acts almost like a
static Cournot player. While other Cournot producers increase their initial
supply by on average 10% when future prospects become bleaker, Russia
actually cuts back by 1-2%.
Our results also suggest that market power may weaken the so-called
Green paradox because the acceleration of production and emissions caused
by lower future demand is dampened. Importantly, however, aggregate pro-
duction unambiguously increases in the short run also under Cournot com-
petition. The Green paradox therefore remains, although weakened.21
In order to derive our theoretical results, the analytical model featured
quite strict assumptions on functional forms. Still, it is reasonable to expect
that the mechanisms detected will be present in more general cases. In this
21Note that the green paradox is weakened by market power also if firms are symmetric,
because Cournot firms are less willing to increase production due the associated fall in
price (as compared with competitive firms).
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respect, we observe that the theoretical results are supported by the more
realistic numerical model.
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A Appendix
In order to derive equation (16), i.e., the first order condition for the Cournot
players, we set up the Lagrange function, optimizing wrt. pEt instead of qit:
22
L =
T∑
t=0
(1+r)−t
(
pEt − cit(Ait)− cτit
)D¯Et · (pEt )E − (qimp0 + κtpEt )−∑
j 6=i
qjt − qexogt

+
T∑
t=0
λrit
Ait+1 −Ait −
D¯Et · (pEt )E − (qimp0 + κtpEt )−∑
j 6=i
qjt − qexogt

(18)
Here we have inserted for qit = D
E − qimpt −
∑
j 6=i
qjt − qexogt (qexogt de-
notes the exogenous supply from small European producers). λrit is the (dis-
counted) shadow price on the resource constraint in (13). Differentiating
with respect to pEt gives:
(1 + r)−t
D¯Et · (pEt )E − (qimp0 + κtpEt )−∑
j 6=i
qjt − qexogt

+
(
pEt − cit(Ait)− cτit
)(
ED¯Et ·
(
pEt
)E−1 − κt)−λrit(ED¯Et · (pEt )E−1 − κt) = 0
(19)
This can be simplified as follows:
qit +
(
pEt − cit(Ait)− cτit
)(EDE
pEt
− κt
)
− λit
(
EDE
pEt
− κt
)
= 0 (20)
22The normal procedure in Cournot models is to optimize wrt. output, as output is the
strategic variable in Cournot models. However, since there is a one-to-one relationship
between output and prices in the optimization problem for the individual Cournot player
(assuming interior solution), optimizing wrt. output is equivalent with optimizing wrt.
prices. Moreover, since it is not possible to derive a reduced form expression for the inverse
residual demand function in this case, we choose to optimize wrt. price.
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where we have replaced λrit(1 + r)
t with the undiscounted shadow price
λit. Reorganizing we get (15).
Similarly, by differentiating (18) wrt. Ait, using (14) and inserting back
for qit, we get (16).
Figure A1. Unit production costs, shadow price and oligopoly rent
for Norway. $ per toe.
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Figure A2. Unit production costs, shadow price and oligopoly rent
for Algeria. $ per toe.
Figure A3. Unit production costs, shadow price and oligopoly rent
for the Netherlands. $ per toe.
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Theoretical Model Numerical Model
Market structure Two Cournot producers Four Cournot producers;
exogenous supply from other
European producers;
price-responsive import of gas
Time Continuous Discrete
Demand Linear Iso-elastic
Marginal cost of extraction Constant Stock dependent, increasing
Resource Stock Finite Infinite
Transportation cost Zero Positive, constant
Shale gas Introduced in Period 2 Gradual introduction
Table A1. Comparison of theoretical and numerical models
European consumption of natural gas in base year (bcm) D¯Et 558
Russian consumption of natural gas in base year (bcm) D¯Rt 413
European gas price in base year pE (US dollars per 1000 cm) 383
Russian gas price in base year pR (US dollars per 1000 cm) 99
Long-run price elasticity Europe E -0.5
Long-run price elasticity Russia R -0.25
Income elasticity Europe (first 25 years)∗ 0.42
Income elasticity Russia (first 25 years)∗ 0.15
Table A2. Demand side parameters
∗The income elasticities decline over time (cf. main text)
Russia Norway Netherlands Algeria
Initial unit extraction costs c0i 83 46 46 35
Cost parameter (accumulated production) ηi 0.044 0.80 2.45 1.00
Discount rate r 4 % 4 % 4 % 4 %
Technological progress θi 2 % 2 % 2 % 2 %
Table A3. Supply side parameters Cournot producers
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Constant in LNG import supply function qimp0 17.6
Initial slope parameter in LNG import supply function κ0 0.18
Annual (exponential) increase in κt 1 %
Shale gas supply from 2035 (bcm) 150
Initial supply from European, non-Cournot producers 99
Table A4. Supply side parameters other
Russia Non-Russia
Benchmark -1.4% 10.4%
Lower parameter value Higher parameter value
Russia Non-Russia Russia Non-Russia
Price elasticity Europe -3.0 % 8.9 % 0.1 % 10.6 %
Price elasticity Russia -1.3 % 10.5 % -1.5 % 10.4 %
Income elasticity Europe and Russia -1.4 % 10.1 % -1.4 % 11.1 %
Initial costs Non-Russian Cournot players -1.9 % 9.4 % -1.0 % 12.4 %
Initial costs Russia -0.6 % 11.4 % -3.0 % 9.2 %
Reserves Non-Russian Cournot players -1.1 % 14.3 % -1.4 % 6.4 %
Reserves Russia 0.8 % 10.0 % -1.9 % 10.7 %
LNG inverse supply slope -1.2 % 9.0 % -1.3 % 12.2 %
Discount rate -1.3 % 21.9 % -1.1 % 4.0 %
Table A5: Sensitivity analysis. Percentage changes in initial Rus-
sian and Non-Russian Cournot supply in SHALE scenario (com-
pared to BENCHMARK scenario).
Note: “Lower parameter value”: The parameter is divided by 2. “Higher
parameter value”: The parameter is multiplied by 2.
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